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review, see Surprenant and Neath, 2009a). 
They concluded that interference, rather 
than trace decay, was responsible for for-
getting over the short-term. Consistent 
with the interference view, performance 
decreased over trials.
Baddeley and Scott (1971), however, 
suggested that the Keppel and Underwood 
(1962) data suffered from ceiling effects 
which might have masked forgetting. 
They therefore addressed first trial forget-
ting when ceiling effects were absent. In 
Experiment 1, 152 subjects heard a single 
five-item list of digits in random order 
which they recalled after 3, 30, 60, or 120 s. 
During the delay, subjects wrote down 
letters that were read aloud by the experi-
menter. Results (data points, left panel of 
Figure 1) included clear evidence of for-
getting between 3 and 30 s on the first (i.e., 
only) trial.
Experiment 2 further explored single 
trial forgetting. Four hundred twenty-four 
subjects recalled three-, five-, or seven-item 
lists of digits after 0, 3, 6, 9, 18, or 36 s. The 
distractor task was again writing letters. 
The results are shown (as data points) in 
the right panel of Figure 1. Baddeley and 
Scott (1971, p. 282) included in their analy-
sis data from other studies and noted that 
over all of the studies, including their own, 
“forgetting approaches asymptote within 
approximately 5 s.”
Subjects received only a single trial, pre-
venting proactive interference, yet forgetting 
occurred. Other possible sources of interfer-
ence were considered and discounted. First, 
retroactive interference from the distractor 
task was thought unlikely because of the 
lack of evidence that letters and digits mutu-
ally interfere (Wickens et al., 1963). Second, 
intrasequence interference – items in the list 
interfering with each other – was ruled out 
because such interference should lead to 
faster forgetting for longer lists (see Melton, 
1963) and this was not observed. Baddeley 
and Scott (1971) therefore took their results 
Does decay cause forgetting? For memory 
over the long-term, the answer is generally 
agreed to be “no” (e.g., McGeoch, 1932). 
For memory over shorter time-periods, 
however, debate continues (e.g., Altmann 
and Gray, 2008; Lewandowsky et al., 2009). 
The issue has important theoretical impli-
cations, as the claim that forgetting differs 
over timescales is central to arguments 
against models of memory that deny the 
utility of distinguishing between short-
term and long-term memory (e.g., Brown 
et al., 2007). Here we address two remain-
ing issues. The first concerns empirical data. 
Although many results taken as evidence for 
decay have been accounted for by alterna-
tive accounts (e.g., in terms of interference: 
Neath and Brown, 2006; Brown et al., 2007), 
it has been argued that forgetting demon-
strated by Baddeley and Scott (1971) can-
not be explained without recourse to trace 
decay. Indeed, Nairne (2003, p. 429) stated 
that “the conclusions reached by Baddeley 
and Scott (1971) have largely dominated the 
field for the past three decades.” Here, we 
argue that an interference-based explana-
tion originally dismissed by Baddeley and 
Scott can in fact account for their data. The 
second issue is conceptual, and concerns 
the possible equivalence of decay and non-
decay memory models.
The findings of Baddeley and 
scoTT (1971)
In a typical Brown–Peterson task (Brown, 
1958; Peterson and Peterson, 1959), subjects 
view three items (usually consonants) and, 
after a 3- to 30-s delay, attempt to recall 
them in order. Rehearsal is prevented during 
retention, and forgetting over time occurs. 
Keppel and Underwood (1962), however, 
observed no difference in performance in 
the various delay conditions on the first trial 
of a Brown–Peterson task. For example, in 
their Experiment 2, performance on the first 
trial was identical regardless of whether the 
distractor period lasted 3, 9, or 18 s (for a 
as evidence for a primary memory compo-
nent which decays within about 5 s. Since 
its publication, the study has been cited 
extensively as evidence against an interfer-
ence account of the data and as evidence 
for decay; there are few alternate accounts 
of these particular data and no systematic 
attempts to model the data1. Can a model 
without trace decay explain the data? Here 
we apply a temporal distinctiveness model, 
scale independent memory, perception, and 
learning (SIMPLE; Neath and Brown, 2006; 
Brown et al., 2007), to the results reported 
by Baddeley and Scott.
evidence for inTerference
SIMPLE – scale independent memory, per-
ception, and learning has been described 
in detail elsewhere (e.g., Neath and Brown, 
2006; Brown et al., 2007); here, we focus 
on those aspects relevant to the current 
simulation. Memory is conceived as a dis-
crimination task: items are represented as 
locations along one or more dimensions in 
psychological space and in general, those 
items with fewer close neighbors on the rel-
evant dimensions at the time of retrieval 
will be more likely to be recalled than items 
with more close neighbors. According 
to SIMPLE, unrelated items in episodic 
memory tasks are represented primarily 
or solely along a temporal dimension2. The 
zero point is the time the item is retrieved, 
and each item’s value is the time since pres-
entation, relative to the time of retrieval.
Arguments against memory trace decay: a SIMPLE account of 
Baddeley and Scott
Ian Neath1* and Gordon D. A. Brown2
1 Department of Psychology, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John’s, NL, Canada
2 Department of Psychology, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
*Correspondence: ineath@mun.ca
1Evans and Havens (1978) suggested an explanation 
based on discriminability of temporal cues, but this 
paper has not, to our knowledge, been cited. Henson 
(1998, Demonstration 6) tried to fit his Start–End 
model to just the seven-item condition from Baddeley 
and Scott’s second experiment, but found the model’s 
rate of forgetting was too slow and could not fit the 
data well.
2We note versions of SIMPLE exist in which a position 
dimension, rather than a temporal dimension, is used; 
for a direct comparison of the two versions, see Sur-
prenant et al. (2006).
www.frontiersin.org February 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 35 | 1
OpiniOn Article
published:
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00035
14 February 2012
In Experiment 1 of Baddeley and Scott 
(1971), the presentation rate was one item 
per second, and therefore, initial temporal 
values at the end of presentation will be 
5, 4, 3, 2, and 1 for items 1–5, respectively. 
To these values are added the duration of 
the retention interval (3, 30, 60, or 120 s, 
depending on condition). It is assumed 
that recall takes time; we assumed each 
item takes 1 s to recall. The resulting values 
are logarithmically transformed, and recall 
probability of a particular item depends on 
its local distinctiveness.
The similarity, η
i,j
, between two log-
transformed temporal memory represen-
tations, LT
i
 and LT
j
, is given by Eq. 1:
ηi j
c
e i j, =
− −LT LT
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The main free parameter in SIMPLE is 
c: higher values of c correspond to greater 
distinctiveness and therefore less influence 
of more distant items.
The discriminability of item i, D
i
, when 
given the cue (temporal location) for stimu-
lus j, C
j
, is given by Eq. 2, in which n is the 
number of items in the set:
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Omission errors are possible through Eq. 
3, which shows recall probability, R
i
, based 
on discriminability:
R
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=
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1
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Parameter t is the threshold and 
parameter s can be interpreted as the 
noisiness of the threshold. The above is 
the same way SIMPLE has been applied 
to serial recall data in past demonstra-
tions (see Neath and Brown, 2006; Brown 
et al., 2007).
There are thus three free parameters. 
With c = 3.248, s = 8.253, and t = 0.269, 
SIMPLE shows clear forgetting (the lines in 
the left panel of Figure 1) and adequately 
produces the same pattern observed 
by Baddeley and Scott (1971) in their 
Experiment 1 (R2 = 0.954). Thus, despite 
not incorporating trace decay, SIMPLE 
accounts for the data from Experiment 1 
of Baddeley and Scott in exactly the same 
way as it does for immediate serial recall 
in general.
Why does performance in the model 
decrease between 3 and 30 s, but then effec-
tively asymptote? The key is what Brown 
et al. (2007) term Weberian compression. 
The original temporal values undergo a 
logarithmic transformation, which con-
denses large values more than small values. 
Therefore, there is less of a difference when 
comparing the distinctiveness of items after 
a 30 and 60-s delay than when comparing 
the distinctiveness of items after a 0 and 
30-s delay.
The same basic procedure was fol-
lowed to fit the data from Experiment 2 of 
Baddeley and Scott (1971). Parameters were 
set to c = 0.547, s = 23.131, and t = 0.139 
for all three list lengths and all six delays. 
Results are shown as lines in the right panel 
of Figure 1 (R2 = 0.937). The differential 
forgetting between the three-, five-, and 
seven-item lists is explained entirely by the 
presence of additional items in the list, so-
called intrasequence interference.
discussion
The dominant account of the Baddeley and 
Scott (1971) data is that it offers support 
for a multi-system account of memory in 
which primary (or short-term or working) 
memory decays within a few seconds and 
longer-term recollection is supported by a 
second memory system (see Nairne, 2003). 
The underlying logic was that because all 
sources of interference were minimized or 
eliminated, any observed forgetting must be 
due to decay.
Baddeley and Scott (1971) ruled out 
intrasequence interference as an expla-
nation because they focused on Melton’s 
(1963) account of intrasequence interfer-
ence, which does indeed predict faster for-
getting for longer lists. In contrast, SIMPLE 
does not make this prediction because it is a 
local distinctiveness model: the amount of 
interference for a given item is most affected 
by near neighbors, and therefore extending 
the list length does not necessarily guaran-
Figure 1 | The data points show the proportion of items correctly recalled in Baddeley and Scott’s (1971) experiment 1 (left panel) and the proportion of 
items correctly recalled from three-, five-, and seven-item lists in experiment 2 (right panel) as a function of delay. The solid lines show the fit of SIMPLE (see 
text for details).
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tee faster forgetting. Thus it is possible to 
account for the data reported by Baddeley 
and Scott without invoking either decay or 
two separate memory systems, and instead, 
by invoking the same interference account 
used to explain data from other paradigms 
(see Surprenant and Neath, 2009b).
equivalence BeTween decay and 
inTerference Models?
We have demonstrated that a model with-
out decay accommodates empirical results 
that have long been taken as evidence for 
decay. It could be argued, however, that 
the SIMPLE model can be interpreted as 
a high level model that does not specify 
the key underlying processes (i.e., decay 
vs. interference)3. Essentially, this charge 
argues that the concept of “relative dis-
tinctiveness,” which is central to SIMPLE’s 
behavior, could be implemented through 
trace decay mechanisms. We consider this 
within the context of a time-based decay 
model of Anderson et al. (1998), which uses 
the ACT-R framework.
In the ABLM model, the baseline activa-
tion of a single occurrence of a chunk in 
memory decays as a logarithmic function 
of elapsed time. Thus the baseline activa-
tions of items stand in the same relations to 
each other as do the logarithmically trans-
formed temporal distances used by SIMPLE 
and could, at least algebraically, be used for 
the same purpose, in much the same way 
dimensions other than time have been used 
with SIMPLE (see Chapter 8 of Surprenant 
and Neath, 2009b). Specifically, if the con-
fusability of items in memory were related 
to the differences in their levels of decayed 
baseline activations, and the probability of 
recalling a given item was inversely related 
to its summed confusability with all other 
items, then a trace decay mechanism could 
be used to implement the same temporal 
distinctiveness computations as SIMPLE 
assumes4.
The psychological interpretation of this 
type of account, however, appears some-
what counterintuitive. The decay theory 
interpretation claims that what makes a 
temporally distant item hard to remember 
is not its low level of activation, but rather 
the fact that there are many other items with 
similarly low levels of activation. Indeed, in 
such a model there would be no direct rela-
tion at all between the level of activation 
of an item and the probability of recalling 
that item; instead, all that would matter is 
how similar the level of activation of the 
item was to the levels of activation of other 
items. It would be unnatural, then, to say 
that forgetting occurs due to decay.
We assume that a plausible mechanism 
of decay-based forgetting makes at least 
two claims: first, that activations reduce 
over time, and, second, that retrieval 
probability in some way reflects absolute 
level of activation. Once it is assumed 
that items which have decayed more can 
nonetheless be better retrieved, the model 
ceases to be a trace decay model in any 
commonsense usage. Thus although the 
SIMPLE account is couched at a high level 
of description and could be implemented 
in more than one way, we suggest that an 
interpretation in terms of trace decay 
stretches the meaning of “trace decay” 
beyond normal usage.
In summary, we have argued that classic 
data from Baddeley and Scott (1971), which 
have frequently been taken as evidence for 
decay, are more naturally explained in terms 
of temporal distinctiveness.
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